AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF CONTRACT: FROM FEMINIST
DILEMMAS TO A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF RATIONAL

CHOICE IN CONTRACT LAW
GILLIAN K. HADFIELDt

INTRODUCTION
How do people choose? This question figures prominently in essentially any field that places human behavior within its province.
Choice is a way of describing human action; we can always look at how
one has behaved and indicate how this behavior has affected a choice,
even if we do not think that choicemaking was part of an individual's
self-understanding of her behavior. Distinctive disciplines have distinctive ways of understanding choice: Sociologists might see an individual's choices as determined by that person's socioeconomic
identity, role models, or institutional structures; psychologists, a set of
perhaps unconscious preoccupations rooted in early childhood experiences or current struggles with self-image; sociobiologists, genetic
predispositions and the demands of the struggle for survival. From
these differing perspectives flow different predictions, descriptions,
and explanations for the behavior we observe.
As a discipline, law is interested in how people choose in order to
judge behavior; to decide, from a normative perspective, whether and
how behavior should be constrained or sanctioned. The particular
predictive, descriptive, or explanatory theories of behavior that the
law draws on thus can play a tremendously important role in the
normative design of legal rules and institutions. Behavior understood
to be driven by biological, psychological, or sociological factors beyond individual control, for example, may be treated in the law differently than behavior that is understood to be the product of free
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and deliberate choice. Both principled inquiries into moral accountability and pragmatic inquiries into the efficacy of legal rules aimed at
modifying behavior depend on the underlying model of human action.
Of these models of human action, the one that holds perhaps the
greatest sway in modern legal thought is the model of rational choice.
This model sees human behavior as governed by an assessment of
different courses of action and deliberative, reasoned choice among
these alternatives. From this conception of choice flows the moral
and legal condemnation of negligence or intentional harm, and the
justification for attaching legal consequences to a failure to live up to
contractual promises or statutory duties. Only when behavior is understood to be the product of deliberate choice is it possible to find
conduct blameworthy or to hold out the expectation that legal consequences can influence conduct.
The idea of deliberate, rational choice is thus of importance in
almost every field of law. In contract law, however, the idea takes on
constitutive importance: The very obligations that an individual is
under in contract are a product of that individual's choice. Indeed,
this principle is what distinguishes contract from tort. In contract,
one is obligated only if one chooses to be obligated. In tort, one is
obligated regardless of one's desire to be obligated; the only choice is
whether or not to run afoul of the obligation.
Or, at least, so goes the conventional doctrine. The idea of
choice as the source of obligation in contract has come under scrutiny from a variety of scholars, most notably relational contract scholars and critical theorists such as feminists. Grant Gilmore, for
example, announced in 1974 the "death of contract" as a distinctive
mode of obligafion-if obligations in "contract" arise from considerations of reliance or unjust enrichment, from fairness or justice,
rather than from the will of the contracting parties, as Gilmore observed they do, then contract is not contract; it is tort.2 For relational
contract scholars, modern contract law poses this puzzle: Is it possible
to accept the idea that obligations arise from the norms of a contractual relationship without conceding the death of contract, of
"choice"? For feminist contract scholars, the question is this: Is it
possible to protect women from the oppressive consequences of

' See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
For an illuminating historical treatment of this issue, see JAMES GORDLEY, THE

2

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991).

1998]

AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF CONTRA CT

1237

harmful, constrained choices-in surrogacy or marital separation
agreements, for example-without divesting women of agency? In all
these instances, the idea of what it is to choose comes to the fore.
In this Article, I examine how our underlying conceptions of what
it is to choose animate legal reasoning in contract. In particular, I
contrast the economist's conception of rational choice-which I consider to be a sharply delineated representation of dominant legal
conceptions of rational choice-with Elizabeth Anderson's conception of rational choice.3 Building on the ideas that values are plural,
incommensurable, and socially mediated, and that choice is rational
when it is adequately expressive of values, Anderson constructs a vision of what it is to choose that is a substantial challenge to the dominant conceptions that undergird conventional contract logic. In
doing so, I argue, she provides the basis for reconceptualizing choice
in contract law in a way that should alter radically our understanding
of the source of contractual obligation.
In particular, I defend in this Article the following claim. Conventional contract logic rests on the idea that when someone makes
the choice to enter into a contract, she does so primarily to select a
preferred future state of affairs; enforcement of the contract is then
seen as a neutral act on the part of the law, which merely gives to the
chooser what she chose. If we adopt Anderson's view of what it means
to make a choice, however, this logic no longer applies. For in that
vision we admit the possibility that the chooser assessed her options in
light of what the choice would express rather than what future states
it would secure. That is, the conventional logic is flawed when it asserts that the chooser has, necessarily, by deciding today to contract,
indicated her choice among future states of affairs. Rather she has
indicated her choice among current states of affairs; the choice
among current states has consequences for the future only if the law
attaches them. Analytically, Anderson's challenge to conventional
rational choice theory raises a question that conventional contract
logic thinks it has answered, namely, why does a person's choice at
one point in time determine her legal obligations at another point in
time? Why does a choice in contract have legal significance? It cannot be, after Anderson, simply because the law is a neutral arm of the
state, handing out to contractors what they have asked for. Instead,
the very problem of contract enforcement is that one of the contractors does not want what the state is giving.
3 See ELIzABETH ANDERSON, VALUE

IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
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Anderson's theory as applied here plays a negative role: It defeats
an answer and thus begs an original question, but it does not answer
it. It does not tell us that contracts should not be enforced or what
the remedies for breach should be if a contract is enforced. Rather, I
claim, it tells us that we need to identify reasons, beyond the bare fact
that a choice to enter a contract has been made, for attaching legal
significance to this particular exercise of choice. I suggest in this
Article what some such reasons might be, and in particular, explore
two: the protection of reliance interests and the protection of an
instrumentally valuable convention. The principal point I defend,
however, is that reasons for enforcement are needed, and I observe
that turning to reasons such as reliance or convention would create a
contract law that exhibits more differentiation among types of contract. Faced with the need in a given type of contract to identify a
reliance interest or the instrumental value of a particular convention
of contracting, we may be led to conclude that not all contracts are
enforceable and, moreover, not all are enforceable in the same way or
with the same remedy.
The Article is structured around a trio of feminist puzzles in contract law, but the claims of the Article are general and not limited in
application to the puzzles. Rather, the puzzles are a device by which
to reach the general claim I set out above. Each of these puzzleswhat to do about surrogacy contracts, marital separation agreements,
and a wife's guarantee of her husband's business debts-poses what
feminist legal scholars know as the "dilemma of choice," namely, the
conflict between promoting women's autonomy and freedom of
choice on the one hand, and protecting women from the harmful
consequences of choices made under conditions of inequality on the
other.4 I focus on these feminist puzzles not only for their intrinsic
importance and interest, but also because they tap into and lay bare
the core of what is problematic in contract law and logic more generally: the inadequacy of the conventional conception of rational
choice. After exploring and comparing the conventional conception
of rational choice and Anderson's reconceptualization of rational
choice in generic terms, I revisit the feminist puzzles and discuss how
our answers to the core questions of contract law-whether and to
what extent a contract should be enforced-shift in light of
Anderson's reconceptualization of what it means to choose ration-

4 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Dilemma of Choice: A Feminist Perspective on The
Limits of Freedom of Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 337 (1995).
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I conclude with some thoughts about how the analysis sheds

light on the puzzles that motivate relational scholars and the currently obscured distinctions between commercial and other forms of
contracting. A central conclusion is that Anderson's theory of choice
preserves the bulk of conventional commercial contract law but provides insights into how contract works outside of this traditional core.
I. FEMINIST PUZZLES IN CONTRACr: THE DILEMMA OF CHOICE

What makes a case a puzzle in contract law is deep uncertainty
about the right answer to two questions: Should a promisor be legally
bound by her promise? If so, to what extent, that is, for what remedy
should she be held liable? For feminists, these questions engage difficult issues in a variety of settings in which women make contractual
choices. I analyze the three particularly salient puzzles mentioned
above in light of the feminist dilemma of choice-the conflict between promoting a woman's agency in contract and promoting a
woman's well-being when performance of a contract is harmful and
serves to reinforce inequality and oppression.
A. Surrogacy Contracts
In a surrogacy contract, a woman agrees to relinquish at birth parental rights in relation to the child to whom she gives birth. In the
most common form of such arrangements, the woman is the genetic
mother of the child and the person to whom the child is relinquished
is the genetic father of the child. In other arrangements, the woman
is implanted with an embryo formed of the ovum and sperm of the
people with whom she contracts; and in others the contract is formed
between individuals none of whom has a genetic relationship with the
child.6

5 want to indicate at the outset that Anderson's book was itself motivated by the
surrogacy puzzle and that she deals with what she sees to be the implications of her
theory of rational choice for surrogacy in chapter eight. See ANDERSON, supra note 3,

at 185-89. Anderson, however, approaches the problem as a question of policy and
public law-should we permit surrogacy? My interest is in the implication of
Anderson's theory for legal reasoning-in particular, contract reasoning.
6 SeeJaycee B. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 696 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting

that the sperm and the egg in this case were donated from anonymous individuals and
then implanted into the uterus of a woman other than the intended legal mother).

1240

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANA LAWREViEW

[Vol. 146:1235

More accurately called contract pregnancy,7 these contracts raise
two difficult questions. The first is a public-law question and is concemed with whether, as a society, we should permit individuals to
contract for the conception of a child and the allocation of parental
status. This question raises the specter of commodification, and
feminists grapple with the implications for children, women, and
sexuality of the use of market mechanisms to structure childbirth and
parenting.8 The second question is a private-law contract puzzle. It is
concerned with whether, in a given case in which the birth mother
refuses to relinquish her parental status and in the absence of publiclaw prohibition, contract law should find that the birth mother has a
contractual obligation to relinquish the child. Further, the second
question asks whether any breach of this obligation should be remedied with an order of specific performance as opposed to an order for
compensation.
The courts have struggled with the surrogacy puzzle originally
made famous by the Baby "M"case in NewJersey.9 Prior to reversal on
appeal on public-policy grounds, the trial court in the Baby "M" case
held that the contract was enforceable and granted specific performance: termination of the birth (and genetic) mother's parental
status.'0 In Johnson v. Calvert, a case in which the birth mother -was
genetically unrelated to the child and the intending mother under
the contract was the genetic mother, the California Supreme Court
held that the intent of the parties as revealed by the contract was the
"tie-breaker" under the Uniform Parentage Act that otherwise granted both the birth mother and the genetic mother parental status." As
later interpreted by the California Court of Appeals, however, the
Johnson case did not hold that such contracts are enforceable.

7 In the usual arrangement, the woman who gives birth is also the genetic mother
and not a "surrogate" for a mother. She is perhaps a surrogate wife. I will use the
term "birth mother" to refer to the woman who gives birth, whether she is genetically
related to the child or not.
8 For a discussion of commodification issues, see MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODrrES (1996). I review this book in Gillian K. Hadfield, Book
Review, 48 U. TORONTO LJ. (forthcoming 1998).
9 See In reBaby "M," 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987),rev'd in part and
affd inpart, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).

'0 Seeid. at 1175.
n 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993).

12 See Moschetta v. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The most

that can be safely extracted from the [Johnson] opinion is that gestational surrogacy
contracts do not necessarily offend public policy.").
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The views of the majority and the dissent in Johnson clarify the
conflictfor feminists in these cases. As the majority stated:
The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently
agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented women from attaining equal economic rights and professional status under the law. To
resurrect this view is ... to foreclose a personal and economic choice on
the part of the surrogate mother ....

The dissent observed the other half of the dilemma:
Surrogacy critics, however, maintain that the payment of money for
the gestation and relinquishment of a child threatens the economic exploitation of poor women who may be induced to engage in commercial
surrogacy arrangements out of financial need. Some fear the development of a "breeder" class of poor women who will be regularly employed
to bear children for the economically advantaged. Others suggest that
women who enter into surrogacy arrangements may underestimate the
a child they have nurtured in
psychological impact of relinquishing
14
months.
nine
for
bodies
their

The debate is paralleled in the feminist literature. Failure to enforce a woman's commitments is seen as a lack of respect for her as
5
an autonomous agent. Yet, how is the feminist supposed to reconcile this endorsement of abstract autonomy with the situational reality
expressed by some of the women who have served as surrogates,
women who attest that, contrary to plan, the loss of the child at birth
6
was experienced "like a death"? Feminist philosopher Virginia Held
argues that the very idea of putting mother-child relations into a contractual structure, a structure that emphasizes autonomy, is to deny
the reality of mothering:
To see contractual relations between self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals as constituting a paradigm of human relations is
many feminists are beginning to agree, to overlook or to discount
..
in very fundamental ways the experience of women.

'4

Johnson,851 P.2d at 785.
Id. at 792 (Kennard,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

See MICHAELJ. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 51 (1993)

(comparing women's autonomy in the contexts of abortion and surrogacy contracts);

Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-BasedParenthood: An Oppordistunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 354-55 ("[Tlhe reality of sex
act
to
unable
are
women
that
categorically
presume
to
reason
a
not
is
crimination
parental
and
procreation
about
decisions
to
freely and responsibly with reference
intentions.').
16 For a graphic narrative about the experience of the first legal surrogate mother
in the United States, see EIiZABETH KANE, BIRTH MOTHER (1988).
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A woman can have decided voluntarily to have a child, but once
that decision has been made, she will never again be unaffected by the
fact that she has brought this particular child into existence.17
Therein lies the dilemma: Do surrogacy contracts promote a
woman's autonomy by recognizing her authority to contract, or do
they perpetuate the error of ignoring what is real and fundamentally
not governed by the norms of contract in women's experiences? Do
they put a woman in charge of her life, or do they put her in the service of abstract principles that are at odds with what she knows to be
true?
B. MaritalSeparationAgreements
Surrogacy poses the dilemma between the autonomy of contractual choice and the harm of contractual enforcement in stark terms.
Generally, the dilemma is present in less stark terms in other settings.
One such setting that has received substantial recent attention from
Canadian courts is the marital separation agreement.
The dilemma is typically presented by marital separation agreements that fail to balance the financial needs of one spouse with the
financial resources of the other. The Canadian Supreme Court addressed this issue in Pelech v. Pelech.'8 The case involved a couple who
divorced in a jurisdiction that did not, at the time, provide for the
sharing of matrimonial property between spouses. They were married for fifteen years, during which time Mrs. Pelech, in addition to
raising two children, worked as a receptionist and bookkeeper for her
husband's general contracting business. The trial court found that
Mrs. Pelech suffered from severe psychological problems, and
awarded custody of the couple's two children to Mr. Pelech. Although the trial court granted Mrs. Pelech permanent maintenance,
she subsequently agreed to accept a lump sum payment of $28,760 in
lieu of the awarded maintenance. Fifteen years later, Mrs. Pelech
sought an order for spousal support, despite her contractual waiver.
At that time, she was "'living at a poverty existence level.'" ' 9 Due to
physical and psychological problems, she was unable to work; she had
exhausted the funds received at divorce; and she received welfare
17Virginia

Held,

Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View, in SCIENCE, MORALnY &

FEMINISTTHEORY 111, 113, 126 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987).

38 D.L.R.4th 641 (1987).
'9 Id. at 645 (quoting lower court opinion).
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payments of $430 per month. Mr. Pelech, in contrast, had accumu0
lated a net wealth of $1.8 million.
In an opinion written by Justice Wilson, the first woman to sit on
the Canadian Supreme Court and an acknowledged feminist, the
Court held that even though the court retained the jurisdiction to
award and vary maintenance, separation agreements must be enforced absent "a radical change in circumstances flowing from an
2
economic pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage."
The Court based this result squarely on the need to respect choices,
particularly women's choices.2
In the years following Pelech, Canadian courts have continued to
struggle with the finality of separation agreements. In Moge v. Moge,
of timefor example, the Supreme Court addressed the concepts women.23
divorced
for
self-sufficiency
and
limited spousal support
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 emphasized that the economic impact of
traditional marriages-in which women sacrifice investment in their
own earning capacity in order to maintain a household, raise children, and support their husband's investment in his earning capac24
ity-carry on long past the marriage's end. This notion is evidenced
by the dramatic changes in women's economic well-being following
divorce, as compared to men's, and the overrepresentation of women
among the poor. The Court concluded that the goals of the Divorce
when the wife
Act require support payments to continue indefinitely
2
5
self-sufficiency.
economic
achieve
to
is unable
Although Moge dealt with court-ordered support payments and
not separation agreements, the impact of the Supreme Court's rejection of the self-sufficiency model is evident in the subsequent struggle
to determine the weight that time-limited separation agreements
should be given. For example, an Ontario court recently awarded
spousal support to the wife in a twenty-three-year traditional marriage
(she had a ninth grade education and a secretarial certificate; her
20 See id.at 644-45.
21

Id. at 677.

22 See id. at 675 ("I believe that [a] case by case approach and the continuing surveillance by the courts over consensual arrangement of former spouses... will ulti").
mately reinforce [gender] bias ....
2' 99 D.L.R.4th 456, 462 (1992) (ordering "spousal support of $150 per month for
an indefinite period").
eco24 See id. at 487 ("[I]n many cases a former spouse will continue to suffer the
nomic disadvantages of the marriage and its dissolution while the other spouse reaps
its economic advantages.").
' See id. at 499.
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husband had earned a Ph.D. during the marriage and was now a professor) despite the fact that she previously had agreed to waive all
future rights to support. 26 The "package," as the parties referred to it,
included provisions relating to the matrimonial home, child custody,
and support, and gave the wife $1400 per month for two years. 27 The
agreement, signed with legal advice, stated: "Thereafter, regardless of
her situation, the wife will forever be responsible for her own support,
regardless of any change in circumstances, no matter how catastrophic such change in circumstances might be ...., Following the
divorce, the wife resumed studying in hopes of becoming a legal secretary.2 Three years later, she could not afford to pursue her studies
further-rather, she worked sixty hours a week at two temporary jobs
earning a total of $1700 per month. 0 The court held that her inability to obtain full-time employment was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the agreement, and that her change in circumstances related to a pattern of dependency in the marriage.3'
This case presents the same dilemma as Pelech. As the dissent in
Santosuosso observed: "It is difficult to imagine a separation agreement entered into on a more fully informed basis reflective of the
highest level of propriety with competent legal advice being rendered
before the agreement was signed."3 2 Yet, Mrs. Santosuosso's plight is
hardly unusual. Against the backdrop of the economic realities facing divorced women-realities that the Moge court held must be taken
into account in determining the financial obligations of a former
husband in the absence of a separation agreement-and the evident
failure of some separation agreements to take them into account, the
price of respecting women's autonomy and "encourag[ing them] to
take responsibility for their own lives and their own decisions, " 33 is
that women are left to bear the full brunt, including potential poverty, of their now wasted marital investment.

21

See Santosuosso v. Santosuosso, 32 O.R.3d 143 (Gen. Div. 1997).

217See id. at
2S

145.

Id.

29

See id. at 155.

20

See id. at 155-56.

3' See id. at 156.
12 Id. at

160 (Browne,J, dissenting).

33Pelech v. Pelech, 38 D.L.R.4th 641, 676 (Can. 1987).
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C. Spousal Guarantees
The dilemma of agreements between spouses is even sharper
when those spouses are negotiating something other than the dissolution of their marriage. Whereas separation agreements are reached
against a background of settled law, agreements during marriage
operate in a virtual legal vacuum. Indeed, the issue of intramarital
agreements rarely arises, but when it does, the courts struggle with
the nature of such contracts.s4 In a series of recent decisions, the
British courts have confronted the dilemmas posed when a wife
agrees to pledge the matrimonial home to guarantee her husband's
business debts.
The issue often takes the form presented in Barclays Bank v.
O!Brien.35 In that case, Mr. O'Brien sought a second mortgage on the
family home as security for debt incurred by his company; that process required the consent and signature of his wife. The bank obtained her signature without explaining the document and she signed
it without reading it, relying upon her husband's underrepresentation of the potential liability involved. When the bank eventually
foreclosed on the mortgage, Mrs. O'Brien argued that the bank could
not enforce the mortgage obligation because she had signed the
agreement as a result of the undue influence or misrepresentation of
her husband. The House of Lords held that the bank, having failed
to take reasonable steps to ensure that Mrs. O'Brien had "entered
into the obligation freely and in knowledge of the true facts," was
charged with constructive notice of the husband's undue influence or
37
misrepresentation and, therefore, could not enforce the obligation.
The court also held that absent unusual circumstances, "a creditor
will have taken such reasonable steps to avoid being fixed with constructive notice if the creditor warns the surety.., of the amount of
her potential liability and of the risks involved and advises the surety
8
to take independent legal advice."

See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 574 (Eng. C.A.) (stating the traditional doctrine that intramarital agreements are unenforceable unless there is clear
evidence the parties intended legal obligation).
ss [1993] 4All E.R. 417 (H.L.).
4

6

-7

See id. at 421.
Id. at 431.

Id. at 431-32.
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The court in O'Brien recognized both sides of the dilemma:
[S]ociety's recognition of the equality of the sexes has led to a rejection
of the concept that the wife is subservient to the husband in the management of the family's finances. A number of the authorities reflect an
unwillingness in the court to perpetuate law based on this outmoded
concept. Yet... although the concept of the ignorant wife leaving all
financial decisions to the husband is outmoded, the practice does not
yet coincide with the ideal.... The number of recent cases in this field
shows that in practice many wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. Such wives can reasonably look to the
law for some protection when their husbands have abused the trust and
confidence reposed in them.
[T]he sexual and emotional ties between the parties provide a
[..
39
ready weapon for undue influence ....
But although the court recognized the dilemma, it did not resolve
it. For a woman who is truly the victim of her husband's wielding of
sexual and emotional ties as a "ready weapon," all the independent
legal advice in the world cannot overcome the fear that she will damage the relationship with her husband if she opposes his wishes. Although it provides banks with a safe harbor, the rule does not
accomplish what logically the court said it must, namely "satisfying
[the creditor] that the surety entered into the obligation freely." 0
The solution is a logical remedy for the problem of marital misrepresentation; it is not a remedy for the complex "sexual and emotional"
factors that produce marital "agreements."
Thus, the dilemma remains. On the one hand, the complexity of
the relationship between husband and wife (or, as "theHouse of Lor-ds
explicitly recognized in O'Brien, between any cohabitees with an emotional involvement) makes plain the risk that a wife asked to guarantee her husband's debts 41 will agree to do so out of subservience or

Id. at 422, 424.

'0 Id. at 431.
4 The House of Lords has drawn a sharp distinction between the cases in which
the security is given against a husband's business debts and when it is given against a
joint loan to the couple. See CIBC Mortgages v. Pitt [1993] 4 All E.R. 433, 437 (H.L.).
As Megan Richardson has emphasized, however, the distinction is weak. See Megan
Richardson, Protecting Women Who Provide Security for a Husband's, Partner'sor Child's
Debts: The Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective 16 LEGAL STUD. 368, 371 (1996)
("[I]t cannot be assumed that [the wife in O'Brien] had no interest in a loan made to a
company whose business supported the family income. In Pitt on the other hand, the
facts demonstrate that, even in the case of a joint loan contract, the woman may be
only nominally a borrower with no real role in dealing with the money.").
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dependency, providing "another. expression of the already existing
imbalance of economic, social and political power within the family."42 Yet, many feminists will chafe at the idea that women are in

need of "tender treatment" and that such treatment may be institutionalized in the form of banking procedures. Many women would
take as an insult to their competence the instruction that they (but
not their husbands) must obtain legal counseling before a bank will
contract with them. For some, indeed, it may rise to the level of sex
discrimination to require that women but not men incur the cost of
legal advice.
D. The Dilemma in ContractLogic

Each of these cases-surrogacy contracts, separation agreements,
and spousal guarantees-is a puzzle for contract law because of contract law's understanding of choice. Contract law proceeds from the
premise that obligation is established by the existence of voluntary
and informed choice to enter into a contract. Hence, the defenses to
the enforcement of a contractual obligation must demonstrate a defect in the circumstances of choice: a failure of voluntariness or an
absence of adequate information.
In the surrogacy cases, for example, in the absence of publicpolicy limitations, a birth mother seeking release from the obligation
to surrender parental status must demonstrate that she was coerced
into the agreement or that she was mistaken about her ability to resist
forming a maternal bond with the child. Her success under these
doctrines is unlikely if the courts apply the same standards they apply
in ordinary contract cases. The "coercion" a surrogate mother is
likely to have experienced is the coercion of poverty or limited means
that would not release her from any other contractual obligation.
The mistake she makes is a unilateral mistake about the future and
therefore not one she easily can shift onto the other contracting parties. Nor is she likely to succeed with an unconscionability argument
that falls short of a public-policy finding that it is always unconscionable to extract an agreement from a woman to surrender for a fee a
child to whom she gives birth.4
"2 Richardson, supra note 41, at 382.

Instances of unconscionability are conceivable, particularly in light of stories
about recruiting efforts made by surrogacy brokers. These brokers are lawyers who
advertise for women to "enroll" in their surrogacy "programs" but who simultaneously
act as the attorney for the intending parents. They thereby place themselves in a
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It is the unlikelihood of success with these contract defenses that,
in fact, crystallizes the feminist dilemma. For if women were the
beneficiaries of special doctrines of mistake or coercion, they would
thereby be identified, in the logic of contract, as less competent, and
more deserving of "tender treatment," than the autonomous agent
with whom the law ordinarily deals. The spousal guarantee cases
make this point plain. It is easy to imagine that some of the husbands
in these cases are also acting out of complex motives related to gender inequality: the husband who is "coerced," for example, by his
role as sole provider and the norms of masculinity to take on imprudent levels of debt to save his failing business. Yet, this husband will
have no recourse in the courts, no protection from his "folly." The
law does not presume that people always choose wisely or in their own
interests. Indeed, it establishes that contract enforcement is neutral
and that responsibility for the consequences of a foolish choice ordinarily lie with the chooser. When a woman seeks release from a
harmful contract, she argues that she is exceptionally diminished in her
capacity to assume responsibility for her choices. There's the rub.
In all three contract puzzles, the logic of contract is this: Contrac'tual obligation only turns on the fact of voluntary and adequately informed choice. If voluntary choice exists, the contractual obligation
exists, it is enforceable, and the courts are done. If consent was vitiated by coercion or mistaken premises, then the contractual obligation does not exist, and the courts are done. If asked why a given
contractual obligation is enforced, the court's simple answer is, "she
chose." The normative work is pared to a bare minimum: Once it
has been established that the domain of contract extends, the judicial
interest is only in the fact, not the wisdom, of choice. This is
"freedom of contract"; this is neutrality in contract law.44

fiduciary relationship with the intending parents but not the birth mothers who see
the broker as their "employer." Unconscionability findings in circumstances such as
these, however, likely will lead only to organizational changes, as the roles of lawyer
and recruiter are unbundled and fees allocated accordingly. The core of the dilemma
of surrogacy is unmoved by such changes.
"' This is evident in the debate over substantive versus procedural interpretations
of unconscionability doctrine. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 33235 (2d ed. 1990). Substantive unconscionability doctrine is "interference" with freedom of contract, a limitation on the court's willingness to enforce a contract based
solely on the court's assessment of inequality in the bargain. Procedural unconscionability is not interference with freedom of contract. It is the perfection of the idea:
Only those contracts reached under conditions that reasonably ensure that a party
entered into a contract willingly and knowingly are enforceable.
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But is this how "contract" must work? It may seem so, by definition. If it is so, then women are indeed caught in the dilemma: Either they are competent contracting agents or they must plead
incapacity or vulnerability of one sort or another. It is the logic of
this definition of "contract" that I want to question.
I will develop this idea further in the following sections, but at
this juncture I want only to identify an alternative logic, one that does
not turn exclusively on the fact of choice. Helpful in this analysis is an
appeal to a category of existing cases, indeed the category to which
Grant Gilmore primarily appealed when he announced the "death of
contract." These are the promissory estoppel cases, summarized in
section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts.
Promissory estoppel doctrine holds that a promise that is intended to be relied upon or that reasonably can be expected to in45
It
duce reliance is enforceable if and to the extent justice requires.
because
precisely
law
represents a challenge to the core of contract
the enforceability of the promise does not turn solely on the fact of
whether an individual chose to be obligated. The answer to the question of whether this contractual obligation should be enforced is not
the simple, "she chose." Having established a voluntary choice about
obligation (the making of a promise intended to be relied upon), the
court still has work to do before contractual obligation is established.
For even such a voluntary choice will only be enforced after the court
has assessed the nature of reliance and inquired into what justice
requires. Moreover, the court will have to determine the extent to
which the obligation should bind-that is, the remedy that justice
requires. In the ordinary contract case, of course, the remedy follows
once the obligation is found: The plaintiff is entitled to be put in the
position she would have been in had the promise been performed,
4 English/Canadian doctrine limits the application of promissory estoppel to
those cases in which the promise is a modification of existing legal relations. The
doctrine can be stated as follows: A promise that is intended to alter legal relations,
intended to be relied upon, and in fact relied upon, is enforceable where it would be
inequitable to allow the promisor to revert to the prior legal relationship. See D. & C.
Builders, Ltd. v. Rees [1965] 3 All E.R. 837, 843 (C.A.); Combe v. Combe [1951] 1 All
E.R. 767, 768 (C.A.); Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd.
[1947] 1 YLB. 130, 134 (1946).
The American doctrine is given in section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person ... is binding if injustice

can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach
may be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1)
(1973).
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usually through monetary compensation. In the promissory estoppel
46
cases, the remedy may be restitution, reliance, or expectation.
The point is that an alternative contract logic, in the way I am using these ideas, is a contract logic that asks more than whether one
has made a voluntary choice to obligate herself. The issue is not
whether she chose to be obligated; rather it is what the legal significance of her choice to be obligated should be. An essential difference from tort law nevertheless exists. In tort, the obligation is
imposed irrespective of an individual's desire to be obligated. In
contract, as reconceived in section 90, if an individual is obligated it is
because she chose to be obligated and the court found reasons to
attach legal significance to that choice.4 7 The self-created nature of
the obligation is still necessary, but it is no longer sufficient.
Put bluntly, the reconceptualization of contract law that I am aiming at responds to the short answer "she chose" with "so what?" This
is where the conceptualization of rational choice enters the picture.
The adequacy of the answer "she chose" and the need for the followup "so what" depend on the underlying conception of what it means
to say "she chose." The dominant conception of rational choicewhich I will explore in terms of the economic conception of rational
choice as an exemplar-makes "she chose" seem like an adequate
answer. Elizabeth Anderson's conception of rational choice-of
choice as expressive of pluralistic and incommensurable valuesmakes the follow-up "so what" essential.
II.

COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF CHOICE: ANDERSON AND THE

ECONOMISTS

In this Part, I compare the dominant conception of rational
choice, as exemplified by the economic conception, with Elizabeth
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1973).
There is a bit of a red herring here, namely the objective theory of contract.
Although it is true that contractual obligation attaches on the basis of manifest intent
to be bound, rather than a subjective state of mind, this is thought of as an
"imperfection" due to the inability to observe mental states. The classical will theory
of contract, which is what is played out in the ideas that animate the core of modern
contract doctrine, is based on the idea that obligation arises because of the subjective
decision to be obligated. The incoherence of the will theory and the ways in which
modem contract doctrine depends on more complex ideas than that of the will of the
contracting parties are beyond the scope of this Article. See Abraham Drassinower &
Gillian K Hadfield, Beyond Contract as Promiseand The Death of Contract: A Relational
Theory of Contract (Apr. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
PennsylvaniaLaw Review).
46
17
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Anderson's challenge to this conception. I demonstrate that the
dominant conception animates the idea in contract law that the fact
of choice is sufficient to ground contractual obligation, but that under Anderson's conception of rational choice, the fact of choice is not
sufficient to ground contractual obligation. Such an insufficiency
requires that the work of the courts must extend beyond "she chose."
As a consequence, the feminist dilemma of choice dissolves under
Anderson's theory, and we are led to a different approach to resolving
the contractual puzzles posed by surrogacy, marital separation agreements, and spousal guarantees.
A. Two PreliminaryDistinctions
Before embarking on the discussion of these competing conceptions of choice, I want to clarify the nature of this project by emphasizing two distinctions: first, the familiar distinction between positive
and normative aspects of theory, and second, the distinction between
instrumental and agent-centered theories of contract enforcement.
On the first distinction, my interest in economic theory in this Article is in the positive aspects of the theory. It is not my intent to appeal to economic criteria, such as efficiency, in order to answer the
normative questions of contract law regarding whether a promise
should be enforced and what the remedy should be. Rather, I am
interested in how the conceptual and descriptive aspects of economic
theory animate the normative reasoning that exists in contract doctrine. The normativity here is the self-conscious normativity of contract doctrine, the way contract doctrine establishes normative
propositions and reaches normative conclusions.48 When the picture
of choice that runs through our minds is that of a rational economic
man, how do we approach the doctrinal questions of contract law on
contract law's own terms? My purpose in exploring Anderson's alternative conception, then, will be to demonstrate that when we change
our understanding of what it means to choose, we change our understanding of contract logic. The economic conception supports the
logic that contractual obligation follows from the fact of choice;
Anderson's conception contests that logic as insufficient, and sup43This is exceedingly difficult to pin down, of course. There is overt contract
logic-the meeting of the minds, manifested intent, the reasonable contemplation of
the parties, and so on-and there is the covert logic of values and extraneous decisionmaking principles (like fairness, punishment, and so on). When I refer to the selfconscious normativity of contract law, I mean the normativity that emerges from the
interplay of dominant and subversive reasoning in contract doctrine.
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ports a logic that requires additional reasons, beyond the mere fact of
choice, for contractual obligation to bind.
These ideas will be clarified if we also hold up the distinction between instrumental and agent-centered theories of contract enforcement. An instrumental approach to contract enforcement asks
whether we should enforce promises in order to achieve social goals.
Enforcement in a given instance is then just the implementation of a
desirable institution; justification is centered on the institution, not
the individual case. An agent-centered approach to contract enforcement asks whether we should enforce this promise, and does not
accept an answer that merely restates the justification for enforcing
promises generally.
Some examples will elucidate this distinction. Normative economic analysis asks whether social wealth or welfare is increased by
the enforcement of contractual promises. This approach is instrumental and institution-centered. A contract rule-such as the rule of
expectation damages as a remedy for breach-is thought to be welfare-maximizing; thus, in a given instance, expectation damages are
awarded in order to implement an efficient rule. This is instrumental
reasoning; the particular agent against whom the award is made is not
given any reasons for being held liable. There is no reliance on the
agent's interests in this reason. 49 Her conduct may triggerapplication
of the rule, but it is not the source of the obligation.
An agent-centered justification for enforcement, by contrast, addresses the particular agent and says, for example, "you are obligated
to pay expectation damages because fairness or corrective justice requires that you not renege on the promise to bestow the promised
value on your contracting partner." These reasons are addressed to
the agent-the obligation is founded in her conduct, not merely triggered by it. These reasons are potentially persuasive to the individual-fairness or corrective justice is a principle to which she should
hold herself and to which, in any event, the law will hold her.
The distinction between instrumental and agent-centered justifications can be illuminated further by appeal to John Rawls's treatment of the morality of promising. 5 Rawls argues that for instru-

' This is so even if the efficiency criterion we are using at a given point is Pareto
efficiency, which ostensibly takes the agent's interests into account. Even here, however, we are saying to the agent, we are reaching this result because it will not make
anyone (including you) worse off and will make someone (perhaps you) better off;
still, the obligation flows from ourjudgment that this is a good criterion to apply.
so SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 344-48 (1971).
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mental reasons, a convention of promising is valuable because it allows people to rely on one another and hence achieve more efficient
goals than they otherwise could. The convention itself is not required
by the principles of justice, but once established, the promises are
binding. Why? The purely instrumental answer is that in order to
achieve its valuable goals, the convention of promising requires that
promises be binding. Rawls, however, having justified the convention
on instrumental grounds, moves to an agent-centered justification for
the application of the convention to an individual: A participant in
the convention is bound to keep her promise because fairness requires that she who invokes a (just) convention and benefits from it
must adhere to its rules. Thejustification is agent-centered because it
does not rely exclusively on instrumental reasons for the convention
itself. Rather, it introduces a new reason, a reason based on the fairness of the individual. A fair individual would agree that she is bound
to play by the rules of a game she has chosen to play.5'
The distinction between agent-centered and instrumental justifi-s
contract logic
cations for contract enforcement is important because

2

is overfly agent-centered. Whereas normative economic analysis appeals to instrumental reasons for the rules of contract, courts deciding contract cases rely on agent-centered reasons. This is not to say
that instrumental considerations, such as the impact of a particular
rule on the cost of contracting, are not found in actual contract reasoning. Rather, the overt structure of modern contract lawobligation founded in conduct manifesting an intention to be bound,
release from a contract for reasons of mistake or coercion-is agentcentered. Agent-centered reasons are dominant in that the instrumental considerations cannot stand if they are expressed as being in
direct conflict with an agent-centered reason: Instrumental concerns
about the cost of implementing a rule, for example, must yield if failure to implement the rule would vest obligation in the absence of
manifest intention to be bound or in the face of clear coercion.
My project in this Article is to draw on the descriptive and conceptual features of rational choice theory in order to explore contract
logic in its predominantly agent-centered form. Hence, when I ask
whether we should enforce a contract, and I explore the role of the
economic conception of choice in the answer contract logic gives to
51See

id.

5'2"Contract logic" refers to the resolution of the questions of contract law within

the terms of contract doctrine.
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that question, I diverge from the instrumental, normative response of
economic analysis. The answer to the question of whether we should
enforce a contract must, within contract logic, address the agent involved. I want to explore how differing conceptions of rational
choice lead us to think that the reasons we give that agent are adequate or not. It is agent-centered contract logic that responds, "we
enforce this obligation because you chose to be obligated." The adequacy of that answer is at issue.
B. The DominantParadigm: The Economist's Conception
of Rational Choice
For the economist, human activity is about making choices. An
economic agent surveys the world and identifies various alternatives
among which she has defined preferences; to be rational is to make
choices consistent with these preferences. Preferences reflect an individual's instrumental assessment of the contribution of an alternative to her well-being, and rational choice involves selecting from
alternatives based on their relative value to the individual. Rationality
is consistency and transitivity: If you prefer X to Y and Y to Z then
rationality requires that you prefer X to Z and choose accordingly.
For the rational economic agent, therefore, choice is a rather banal affair. It is complicated only to the extent that the agent needs to
process large quantities of information in order to determine the
benefits in utility terms of alternative courses of action. Should she
go to law school or try her hand at writing novels? The answer results
from collecting and processing information about anticipated costs
and returns (including psychic ones) from both types of employment.
Assuming this information is available, the agent who vacillates over
her choice does so because she has nothing to lose from choosing
one alternative over the other; the only reason for indecision is indifference. Even if the information is not fully available, it is presumed
that the agent evaluates different options and then acts rationally in
accordance with her expected utility function.
The economist does not presume to tell an agent how to evaluate
options; the economic view of value is a subjective one. Nor is it the
case that the economist rejects values that reflect an individual's concern for others. If our would-be novelist/lawyer places a high value
on law school because she believes her success there will make her
parents happy or enable her to afford a larger home for her children,
nothing is at odds with the economist's model. Indeed, the economist is distinctly uninterested in the source of an individual's subjec-
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tive preferences. All that matters is that the individual has stable and
internally consistent preferences establishing an ordering over alternatives, and that she chooses according to them.
The economist qua economist is neutral with respect to an individual's preferences, but this does not mean that the law must be
neutral as well. Viewing an individual through the economist's lens
of rationality, indeed, allows the law to make judgments about individual preferences and choices. Driving carelessly, for example, is a
choice an individual makes based on an assessment of her perceived
costs and benefits. It is perfectly consistent with the rational choice
model to condemn this person for judging the costs of her behavior
to be low relative to the benefits, and to mandate that the individual
who makes this choice should bear the consequences of her behavior.
It is also perfectly consistent to conclude that, by attaching legal consequences to this choice, the law might cause the individual to choose
differently.
The economist's neutrality with respect to preferences is the basis
for a normative stance in law that adopts neutrality and endorses legal
regimes that promote the exercise of free choice. Neutrality is also
the important connection between conventional contract logic and
the economist's conception of rational choice. As seen from the perspective of rational choice theorists, contracting is simply about making decisions so as to produce future desired outcomes. Choosing to
commit oneself through contract is a rational choice like any other,
relying on an assessment of the costs and benefits of present and future consequences of this contract as contrasted with another contract
or no contract. Law that enforces contractual choices thus maintains
its neutrality with respect to the underlying options and relies on the
parties' own assessments about value at the time of contracting. The
law holds an individual to her side of a contract because that is what
she chose.
The key observation here is that the simple logic of "she chose" is
animated by the image of choice in contract as an instrumental selection from alternative future options. It assimilates the choice of a
future course of conduct and outcome with a contemporaneous
choice. "She chose" does not distinguish, fundamentally, between
choice among present alternatives and choice over the future. Nor
does the economist's conception of contractual choice. "She chose"
appears to be an adequate response to the question of why to enforce
an obligation because the image of choice is the image of an individual pointing to what she wants in a shop window displaying tomor-
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row's goods. The question of why you give her this thing is then redundant, easily answered: "she asked for it."5 '
Indeed, to refuse to give an individual what "she chose" is to treat
her as a chooser of limited capacity; it is to accord her less respect
than we accord free and rational beings. Charles Fried emphasizes
this point as follows:
[To] respect those determinations of the self is to respect their persistence over time. If we decline to take seriously the assumption of an obligation because we do not take seriously the promisor's prior conception of the good that led him to assume it, to that54extent we do not take
....
him seriously as a person. We infantilize him
This is a normative stance from which what matters for the law is
whether or not one has chosen. Once we have established that, the
normative work for the law of contracts is done. To engage in further
normative inquiry into the content of the choice or the consequences
that follow on the choice amounts to paternalism and a failure of
respect. These consequences are the ones she chose according to her
conception of the good.
Fried is not an economist, but, in an essential way, he envisions
choice in the same way as the economist. He is collapsing contract
choice-an act that has significance for future well-being-with contemporaneous choice. He is imagining contract choice as an assessment of an array of current options according to some private
metric-"the good." Although he explicitly adverts to the fact that
contractual choice is choice over time, he reduces the significance of
time to the stability over time of preferences or conceptions of the
good, a stability that defines maturity and mastery over the whims of
childhood. As it is for the economist, choice for Fried is the implementation of stable preferences, so choice that is realized immediately and choice that is realized over time are essentially equivalent.

-sIan Macneil has emphasized this point from a different perspective in his writing on relational contracts. Adopting the descriptively accurate but linguistically
cumbersome (and hence seldom-used) term "presentiation," Macneil argues that the
error of standard contract analysis is the failure to recognize that not all contractual
relationships are discrete transactions in which obligations are presentiated, that is,
fully expressed at the moment of contracting; many involve complex ongoing relationships in which there will be future adjustments and modifications. See Ian R.
Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 590

(1974) ("Recognition of a present binding of the future, particularly verbalization of
that recognition, inevitably lags behind the extent to which the future is in fact
bound.").
5' CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 20-21 (1981).
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In either case we give someone what she chose simply because, at
some point, she chose it; the evaluative move was hers, not ours.
This collapse of contractual choice with contemporaneous choice
is so familiar that it can be difficult to remember that it is not necessary. For although it may be appropriate, out of liberal deference to
the individual's knowledge of her own desires, to give someone what
she asks for in a contemporaneous sense, the fundamental problem
of contract law is that the individual against whom the contract is
being enforced is no longer asking for the same thing. Given the
individual's change of mind, the original choice assumes significance
only if the law gives it significance. Unlike the contemporaneous
shop-window choice, the question of why to give a person what she
chose is no longer redundant because there are two choices in front
of us, separated in time. The question is, why does the earlier choice
have any legal significance? The consequences of the earlier choice
only follow if the law makes them follow. The birth mother loses her
parental status, the ex-wife is denied her right to obtain spousal support, the bank is permitted to foreclose, only if the law requires it.
These are legal consequences, not natural consequences. Why
should these consequences be made to follow? The significance of
this question comes into focus when we recognize the distinction
between contemporaneous choice and contractual choice. Both the
economist and Fried, however, collapse this distinction.
C. Anderson's Conception of RationalChoice asExpressive Choice
When the complexity of contractual choice is collapsed into the
image at the shop window, critics such as the feminist begin to chafe
at the degree of abstraction involved. Who are these people who
populate the economist's and Fried's imaginations, who calmly assess
the alternatives available according to a stable set of internally consistent preferences and proceed to select the obvious choice, who apparently feel no passion or emotion, who do not worry about whether
they are choosing well, who never feel trapped by their choices, and
who never discover over time more about themselves and their understanding of their choices? Where is love, duty, fear, self-doubt,
and power? Fried's description of the appropriate stance of the law
with respect to the exercise of contractual choice by free adults
sounds more like Victorian moralism than a model of respect for
others. The feminist dilemma lies in how to reject the implications of
the economist's model of rational choice without adopting the position that women are not rational; that is, in Fried's view, infantile and
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ruled by emotion. This is the dilemma of choice, the apparently
headlong confrontation between being an agent whose autonomous
choices are respected and being an agent who seeks to avoid the legal
enforcement of her choices.
5
Elizabeth Anderson's conception of rational choice offers, I believe, a way out of this dilemma by providing a foothold to a contract
logic that does not see the decision to refrain from implementing a
person's earlier choice as a failure to respect her autonomy.
Anderson's conception of rational choice captures a greater share of
the human experience without relinquishing rationality. Indeed, she
defines rationality as requiring the integration of emotion, relation,
and the possibility of growth into the process of valuing and choosing
among alternatives. Moreover, she recaptures for rationality attributes of community and public meaning, releasing rationality from its
narrow confines within our separate skulls.
Anderson's conception of rational choice begins with the idea
that valuation is both pluralistic and public. Consider pluralism first.
Anderson argues that we value things or states of affairs in multiple
ways. Love is a way of valuing something or someone; respect is another; revulsion another. These modes of valuation are not merely
poetic terms for "more" and "less." Rather, they relate to distinctive
human experiences and, importantly, to social concepts of valuation.
To say that I admire your musical talent, for example, is not merely to
say that I derive a certain sum of pleasure from knowing you or learning of your latest accomplishments. As the complexity and subtlety of
language reveals, taking pleasure in your accomplishments is a different attitude than admiration. Nor can I necessarily say that enjoying
the music you have performed is a greater or lesser value than admiring your ability to perform it.
What is essential about pluralistic valuation is the idea that differ-

ent modes of valuation are incommensurate. This notion is clear
from the fact that the focus in pluralistic valuation is on how something is valued-as an object of love, disgust, or respect, for example-rather than simply how much it is valued. In contrast, the
economist requires that all valuation be ultimately commensurate,
that the question "how much" always be resolved by a single answer.
For rational choice, as we have seen, is nothing more for the economist than choice according to "how much."
s This discussion of Anderson's conception of rational choice is based on
ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 1-90.
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Incommensurability, however, does not imply the impossibility of
choice, of comparison between alternatives and selection among
them. Anderson's theory is indeed a theory of choice-rational
choice-among alternatives. But from her starting point in pluralistic
valuation, Anderson's theory concerns the rationality of choice in
light of the how rather than the how much of valuation. How does
someone decide whether to stay for the duration of a concert or to
leave early in order to meet a friend for a drink? If she values the
performance and the date exclusively in terms of the enjoyment of
the music and the company, if this is how she frames her choice-then
she chooses which pleasure is greater at any moment in time. If she
admires the musician, however, then she must take into account how
leaving in the middle of the concert may fail to express her admiration. If she respects her friend, she must also take into account how
choosing the concert over the date may fail to express her respect.
To Anderson, this way of approaching the choice is required by
rationality. To be rational, according to Anderson, is to express one's
values or, as she terms them, one's rational attitudes. What can it
mean to say that someone admires a musician if she walks out of a
concert as soon as she judges that she would enjoy her friend's company more? Can this action, this choice, be made sense of in light of
the professed admiration? If not, then either this individual does not
in fact admire the musician-does not value the musician or the concert in this way-or she is behaving irrationally.
The public nature of valuation and choice is evident in this formulation. The determination of what rationality requires in turn
requires an appeal to social facts, norms, and understandings. To ask
the question, "can it make sense to walk out on a concert if one admires the musician?" is to appeal to reasons that others might find
sensible or persuasive. It is also to explore the social meaning of a
term such as "admiration." Others may indeed differ greatly on their
perception of the meaning of the terms used, but it is quintessentially
irrational to act in ways or according to a language that make sense to
no one else. We doubt the rationality of those whose reasons and
perceptions of reality are utterly idiosyncratic.
Importantly, for Anderson, what counts as a rational expression of
valuation is itself the subject of reasoned discussion. We cannot say,
in isolation, this act is or is not rational. Rationality will depend on
both the individual's perceptions and the communities in which she
moves. It will depend on the frame in which a given choice is evaluated, and this frame is itself subject to reasoned dialogue with oneself
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and others. Walking out on the concert may make sense at an openair festival with continuous or multiple performances; it may not at an
elegant concert hall. It may make sense in some communities or
cultures and not in others. Perhaps more importantly, through reasoned discussion, we may be able to persuade each other that rationality requires a different valuation than we used to think. Indeed,
much persuasion is aimed towards changing the frame a decisionmaker brings to her choice. We might, for example, attempt to alter
the view of a concert-goer who feels it would be disrespectful to walk
out to join her friend merely to enjoy her friend's company. In doing
so, we urge the decisionmaker to see differently what values are at stake
in a given choice. Discussions with others or self-reflection are helpful precisely when they recast a difficult choice in a different light. It
is a matter of looking at a problem in the right way, and not merely
deciding it rightly. That, to Anderson, is rationality in choice.
Anderson's conception of value is also subject to the demands of
rationality. Anderson speaks of valuation as the holding of rational
attitudes towards individuals, objects, or states of affairs. Valuation
itself, then, has important public dimensions. Through reasoned
discussion with others, we may discover that it is not rational to feel
admiration or respect or revulsion towards someone or some thing.
Valuation is subject to development and change in response to reflection and dialogue. What is inscrutable to the economist is, for
6
Anderson, necessarily the object of potential scrutiny." Valuation
may be the province of subjectivity, but subjectivity, in Anderson's
view, is only rational to the extent that it subjects itself to objective
tests. Thus, Anderson argues that a measure of doubt about one's
values and choices is rational. To be rational, our preferences must
be justifiable to us.
Anderson's theory of rational choice also recognizes that our
valuation and choices are, in many respects, constitutive of who we
are and how we develop as individuals and as communities. Valuation
and choice are rational, at least in part, because of their relationship
to a coherent understanding of ourselves and our relationships to
others. Choices are not just about achieving consequential goals,
such as income. They are about defining and becoming who we are.
m Anderson does allow that there are categories of goods that are valued in exclusively consequential terms based on inscrutable tastes. But whereas the economist
takes all valuation as tastes in this regard, Anderson sees this as properly understood as
a subset, and a relatively small one at that. Not all, or indeed many, choices in life are
like the choice between flavors or colors. Life is not a bowl of ice cream.
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Choosing to stay in a job in which we are harassed, for example, may
be a choice grounded in self-conception. Perhaps this choice confirms our view of ourselves as tough individuals who will not be intimidated. Perhaps we stay because we lack self-respect and perceive
ourselves as deserving of degradation. Perhaps, instead, we think of
ourselves as "nice girls" rather than "strident feminists." In sum, our
valuation of the state of affairs and our resultant choices are ways in
which we weave the narrative of who we are and what we value. It is in
this sense that Anderson's theory sees value and choice as expressive,
not merely instrumental.
In a related vein, Christine Korsgaard has argued that moral conduct is normative in that, as self-reflective beings, we look for reasons
we should act in a given way. Those reasons come from our having
and maintaining coherent identities. 7 This makes plain Anderson's
notion that choice is often fundamentally about expressing and maintaining a coherent sense of self. I choose this way because that is who
I am. Through reasoned reflection and dialogue, I now may choose
differently because I see that this is a better understanding of who I
am and who I should be.
What is banal in economic analysis-the determination of value
and the selection from alternatives according to values-is thus central to Anderson's conception of rational choice. Valuation and
choice are the subjects of self-reflection, shared meanings, dialogue,
and growth. To focus on the rationality of results, measured by their
concordance with a fixed set of given preferences, is to miss the essence of the struggle to be rational, the process of finding rationality.

III. EXPRESSIVE RATIONAL CHOICE: RESOLVING
THE FEMINIST DILEMMAS

Conventional contract logic views contract law as a realm of
purely private ordering in which individuals are free to choose the
structure of their relationships without interference. In this view, law
does not judge the formation, performance, or breach of a contract
on the basis of external juristic values; law acts only as a surrogate for
the values created by the parties themselves. The implication of the
economic (and, more generally, the liberal) understanding of choice
as a purely private matter is judicial indifference toward the makingSee Christine Korsgaard, The NormativeQuestion, inTHE SOURCES OF NORMATIVrIY
7, 18 (Onora O'Neill ed., 1996) ("[Moral claims] must issue in a deep way from our
sense of who we are.").
-7
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and breaking-of contracts. Since value is subjective, no basis exists
for the law to judge the choice of one form of contractual relationship over another.5 Nor is there a basis for judging the decision to
alter a contractual relationship, whether consensually or unilaterally,
through breach. Law aims exclusively to give effect to the arrangements and to protect the interests voluntarily created by contracting
parties. This legal treatment of contracts, based on an economic
model of rational choice, treats contract as purely a private matter.
Hence, a contracting party has only herself to blame for the consequences of her contract since the contract and its obligations are entirely the product of her choice.
Anderson's conception of rational choice as expressive choice can
endorse the idea that contracts are private orderings, but it disrupts
the judicial indifference to contractual consequences that follows in
the conventional logic. For an expressive choice to enter into a contract may spring not from an assessment of the value of future consequences, but rather from a person's judgment that, in the present
moment, signing a given contract adequately expresses her valuation
of a situation, another person, or herself. She may not have pointed
at a particular good in the shop window because she judged it the
best from the array offered, but rather because respect for the shopkeeper or disgust with herself required it. Thus, her choice may have
been fundamentally an expression of her valuation of the present circumstances and not an expression of her consequential assessment of
future options. She may have chosen to make a promise as an end in
itself rather than as an instrument to bring about some future state of
affairs.
If the reason for pointing at the goods in the window was presentoriented and not made with a view to choosing a desired future-if
the promise-making was expressive and not instrumental-what is the
rationale for requiring a state of affairs to follow if, when the future
comes, our chooser now says she does not wish to choose accordingly?
She did not choose that state of affairs; she chose the earlier state of
affairs, and that earlier state determines the later state only if the law
makes certain consequences follow. The question Anderson's picture
of expressive choice demands an answer to is "why should these consequences be made to follow?"

m Public policy, illegality, and substantive unconscionability, if the last exists,
however, do provide limits.
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Anderson's picture does not tell us that there is no good answer to
this question, but it does give the lie to the idea that it is adequate to
answer simply, "well, she chose this future." She did not; she chose a
present now past. The future state of affairs may or may not have
been part of how she framed her choice. Incommensurability in
choice makes it impossible to say that any choice she made must have
been framed with a view to balancing the consequences of her choice.
When we say that her past choice, however she framed it, is a choice
of the future because she must be held to the consequences of her
choice to contract, we beg the question. Instead, let us consider how
contract logic based on Anderson's conception of rational choice
would analyze the three feminist contract puzzles we have identified.
A. Implicationsfor Contracts: Surrogacy Begun
If we adopt the economist's theory of rational choice, the decision
to enter into a surrogacy contract is like any other choice. A potential
birth mother assesses her personal preferences for the available options. She weighs the expected benefits of the income or satisfaction
against the expected physical, emotional, and social costs. The
woman who changes her mind about carrying through with the contract does so, on this theory of rational choice, for one of three reasons: (1) she is opportunistic and seeking to extort the father; 9 (2)
she erred in her calculation of the expected costs and benefits; or (3)
she did not choose rationally to begin with, because of either diminished capacity or coercion.0
According to the conventional logic, the first reason is not
grounds for letting the woman out of the contract. Neither is the
'9 This is Richard Posner's analysis:

[Without a legally enforceable contract] the father and his wife have no assurance that they will actually get a baby out of the deal.... Even if the surro-

gate mother does not renege, she has an incentive to threaten to do so in
order to obtain a higher price than the one she agreed to accept back when
the contract was signed. In other words, if the law refuses to enforce contracts of surrogate motherhood, it empowers surrogate mothers to commit

extortion.
RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 422 (1992).

These latter possibilities are dealt with by Michael Trebilcock, who, while sensitive to the emotional and relational complexities of surrogacy, nonetheless stays within
the economic conception of rational choice in his analysis. See TREBILCOCK, supra

note 15, at 48-57 (examining problematic contracting cases, such as surrogacy contracts, using a market-failure approach). I compare Posner and Trebilcock on this
score in Hadfield, supra note 4, at 339-47, and Gillian K. Hadfield, The Second Wave of

Law andEconomics, 46 U. TORONTO LJ. 181, 184-87 (1996).
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second reason, unless we find an extraordinary mistake. Both Fried's
notion of autonomy and the fact that uncertainty is attendant on almost any choice lead us to the position that, unless there is something
exceptional here, mere regret is no basis for release from the contract.
The third reason necessarily must be limited if we start with the
economic model of rational choice. The economic model assumes
that action is premised on rational choice and that coercion and irrationality are the exception and not the rule. Hence, law motivated by
this vision of human behavior will look for extreme forms of coercion
(rather than the ordinary coercion of gender or class) or irrationality.
To do otherwise would be to unravel the core premises on which such
law is built.
Therefore, what emerges from the economic model of rational
choice is a replication of its one-dimensional view of the birth
mother's choice to enter into a contract. The flattened landscape of
her choice is mirrored by a flattened legal landscape. The economic
model instructs the law to attend only to the instrumental, idiosyncratic weighing of options, and so, the legal consequences that attach
to choice are modulated only by such considerations.
Moreover, the birth mother is isolated in the individuality of her
choice: freedom from the community is also isolation from the
community. Her choice is only about her subjective and inscrutable
preferences, and so, there is no place for communal common concern or participation. When the economic conception of rational
choice is applied to her choice, the features of the landscape that
embody the relationship between her choice and her social context
are flattened. The economic model cuts her off from the community
and from the socially shaped meaning of her actions.
When we turn to Anderson's theory of rational choice, dimensionality and community return. A birth mother's decision to enter
into a surrogacy contract may have been expressive of her values, and
it may have been fundamentally directed towards expressing, at that
point in time, how she saw herself in relation to the world: how she
valued herself, pregnancy, money, her family, and the intending parents. Suppose her act is not best understood as a calculation of expected costs and benefits, but rather as a means of expressing the
values of compassion and generosity towards those unable to bear
children or an act expressing her valuation of her body as a source of
life. Or perhaps it is an expression of self-hatred, of her devaluation
of herself as a responsible mother. Or it may be an expression of her
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valuation of money as evidence of her degraded value to her family.
Perhaps at the moment she decided to enter into that contract, she
was struggling to express to herself, her family, and the world that she
was valuable and worthy of respect.
Anderson's understanding of what it is to choose requires that we
attend to the framing of choice by, and hence the meaning of choice
to, the chooser. Anderson contests the economist's view that every
choice is framed by every chooser as an instrumental assessment relative to some metric. If we accept Anderson's story of what it is to
choose as being more accurate than the economist's, we cannot say
the birth mother's contractual choice was a choice about the future.
For her, it may have been a way of expressing something in the present. This is not to say that she was unaware of the future when she
made the choice. But to interpret what the choice meant for the
chooser,all we can say is that, at that moment, she chose to express her
values in terms of statements about the future. It is the promise about
thefuture, and not the future itself, that she valued. She may have assessed
the future in consequential terms and chosen a promise because it
would produce a future. But it is not, Anderson teaches, necessarily
the case that the choice to promise was framed consequentially. In
some situations, the promise may not be merely an instrument towards an end, but rather the end itself. Indeed, some decision
frames, such as a punitive frame, which interprets the decision to
enter into the contract as an expression of self-loathing, or a defiant
frame, which interprets the decision as an expression of self-value in
the face of economic need, may demand, by the very terms of the valuation they reflect, that the individual not attend to a set of future consequences. Some forms of valuation require that the chooser eschew
certain considerations; unconditional love, for example, is just that.
And so, we cannot retreat easily from answering the question in
the surrogacy case: Why should the decision to enter the contract
govern the relationship between a woman and the child to whom she
has given birth? What is, or should be, the legal significance of the
fact that the birth mother signed a contract, one act performed
among many others? Why and how should this affect the legal relationship between her and the child's biological father? What legal
meaning should we derive from this act of complex individual and
social meaning? We, as a community, cannot evade these difficult
questions by foisting the answer off on the birth mother's choice. We
must determine the implications of her changing choice and accept
responsibility for the consequences imposed on her by the law.
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B. Implicationsfor Contracts: Spousal Guarantees

The dilemmas presented by surrogacy contracts are more easily
understood if we return now to the case of spousal guarantees. Recall
that in the mortgage cases, the English courts struggled to reconcile
their appreciation for the pressures of intramarital decisionmaking
with the needs of banks for assurance in extending credit on faith of
the signatures of both spouses. As the House of Lords has conceptualized the problem, the issue is whether a wife's "true wishes [have
been] overborne because of her fear of destroying or damaging the
wider relationship between her and her husband if she opposes his
wishes."6' We can now see this as an economic conceptualization of
rational choice. The wife is released from the contract because it is
not an implementation of her "true wishes," or her true assessment of
the risks and benefits of the mortgage. Her assessment has been
muddied by the fear of what refusing to sign will mean for her marriage. In the conventional framework, she is released from the contract because her choice is not rational; it fails to carry the moral and
legal imperative of performance because it 'does not accord with the
shop-window image of choices about future states.
The expressive theory of rational choice puts the conventional
logic in this case in sharp focus. It would seem that the court is recognizing the reality of expressive choice, that a wife who signs a mortgage guarantee for the benefit of her husband may be expressing
subservience, supportiveness, respect, love, or fear. Her frame for
assessing her choice is oriented toward the present significance of
that act and not the future calculus of financial risk. The problem for
the conventional logic, however, is that having recognized this truth
about the nature of choice in such a situation, it loses the rationale
for enforcing the choice. Implicitly recognizing that the wife was not
choosing to obtain a tradeoff of credit for risk, the court cannot see
itself as acting merely to give the wife what she wanted. When the
only relevant question is the factual one-is this what she chose?-the
only possible answers are yes and no. In this case, the court cannot
convince itself the answer is yes, and so, the contract is unenforceable.
The conventional logic must find the choice in these cases to be
exceptional. If the notion that a promise is not directed instrumentally at achieving future consequences, but rather is oriented toward
an expression of current relationships, is allowed to become a wide-

6'

Barclays Bank v. O'Brien [1993] 4 All E.1. 417,424 (H.L.).
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spread interpretation of choice, then the unenforceability of contracts becomes the rule rather than the exception. And yet, it is not
difficult to see that the same factors at work in the wife's case are at
work in many other contracts. Indeed, the sharpest contrast is with
the courts' treatment, or rather nontreatment, of the choices made by
the husbands in these cases. It is certainly conceivable that husbands
facing the bankruptcy of "their" businesses (which presumably produce income on which the family depends) are acting not on the
basis of their "true" assessment of the financial risks and rewards, but
rather on the basis of pride, fear, their conception of masculinity,
fidelity to employees, self-loathing, and so on. A husband, like a wife,
may not be acting on his "true wishes" but rather out of fear of the
impact that not signing will have on his marriage, his self-image, or
his wife's, parents', and children's image of him.
Anderson's theory normalizes such choice. Anderson does not
see choices that are oriented to the expressive component of
choice-what a choice means for self and others-as out of the ordinary. By seeing choice as routinely expressive, we are not at the end
of contract reasoning-we are at the beginning. What reasons could
there be for enforcing a promise when it is expressive and not instrumental?
It is not my goal to defend particular reasons that could be given
for enforcement, but rather to emphasize that reasons are necessary to
justify enforcement, and so I consider possible reasons here as examples. In the spousal guarantee case, possible reasons for enforcement
appear readily. Presuming we are not truly in a category of coercion-which, doctrinally, undue influence is not--the first reason is
the bank's reliance interest. On the faith of the wife's signature, the
bank has handed over money. Whatever this signature may have
meant for the wife-an expression of love or self-loathing-and whatever her reasons for now wanting to undo that signature-perhaps
she realizes she was wrong to see the initial decision as she did or to
have failed to demonstrate greater strength in her relationship with
her husband-as between her and the bank, it would seem equitable
that she bear the costs of her choice and of changing her mind.
Those costs are the reliance costs, which in this case equal the value
of the debt. If there is a reason not to apportion the reliance costs to
her, it too is equitable: If the bank had reason to believe that she had
little understanding of the financial risk, then its reliance was not
reasonable. Hence, we obtain directly the logic of leaving the reliance costs with the wife when the bank has taken the further step of
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either explaining these details or requiring that the wife receive independent legal counsel.
The issue, then, from the starting point that ordinary choices are
often expressive and not instrumental, is not whether a choice was
made, but rather, who should bear the reliance costs when a new
choice revises a choice made earlier. Seen from this vantage point,
we can avoid the flawed logic of the spousal guarantee cases as they
currently stand, which remedies the failure of a wife to act on her true
wishes-the lack of adequately rational and hence enforceable
choice-with independent legal advice. As already noted, independent legal advice does not speak to the risk the court articulates,
namely that a wife will not act on her true wishes out of fear that opposing her husband's wishes will harm her relationship with him.
Legal advice, however, does speak to the equities of the apportionment of the reliance costs of ordinary complex decisionmaking, and
its ordinary revision over time, between the wife and the bank. When
the issue concerns who should bear the reliance costs, the assessment
of reasonable reliance comes to the fore. Indeed, a full range of considerations relevant to the relationship between the parties becomes
pertinent. These include the commercial arm's length nature of the
relationship between individuals and banks, the balance of power
between the parties, the risk of advantage-taking, and the need to
protect those with limited sophistication in financial matters.
These considerations, however, need not be applied on a case-bycase basis. Conventional contract logic has been shaped by a desire to
preserve the core of contract and so to cabin relief from contract to
exceptional cases on the margins. When the reliance interest is the
rationale for enforcing a contract, it can be the case that a given category of contracts is assessed together. Therefore, the spousal guarantee cases can all largely rise or fall together, based on an assessment of
how reliance costs should be distributed. As Fuller and Perdue have
argued, contracts are routinely enforced because of the reliance interest that contracts generate. There is no suggestion in this claim
that this need be a case-by-case inquiry, as an equitable doctrine or
section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts requires. As a
matter of doctrine, it is possible to decide that any contract is enforceable because of the reliance interest it generates, or that some
62

See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:

1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) (discussing the motives that may lead a court to grant legal
sanctions against one who has broken a promise); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The RelianceInterest in ContractDamages: 2, 46YALE L.J. 373 (1937) (same).
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are not enforceable because reliance on a contract of a given type is
not reasonable.
Reliance may thus be one reason for enforcing a contract, such as
a spousal guarantee contract, that looks beyond the mere fact of
choice. A second reason is institutional policy: The institution of
mortgage guarantees depends on the ordinary enforceability of the
guarantee. Without ordinary enforceability, the family home becomes "sterile," in the words of the House of Lords, as a source of
collateral to secure credit for family endeavors. Thus, whatever the
meaning of the guarantee for a given individual (wife or husband),
the guarantee is enforceable because of the threat that nonenforcement poses to the stability of this valuable institution.
Whether this is a good reason for enforcing guarantees depends
assessment of the value of the institution and the nature of the
our
on
risk that failure to enforce the contract will pose to the institution for
others. Moreover, this instrumental assessment of the value to society
of the institution reflects a Rawlsian, agent-centered reason for enforcement and suggests a wide variety of factors that may be relevant.
Recall that Rawls argued that the reason an individual is morally
bound to perform a promise is because the principle of fairness requires that one who invokes a convention must adhere to the rules of
the convention.6 The convention of mortgage guarantees, to be
valuable, requires that they be enforceable. Hence, one who benefits
from the institution of mortgage guarantees ordinarily, in fairness, is
bound by the conventional terms. The inquiry into fairness, however,
also could include inquiry into the fairness of the terms of the convention. Again, the balance of power and sophistication between the
parties might be relevant, as might be the presence or absence of
independent legal advice.
To examine the nature of this contract logic and the way it grows
out of a reconceptualization of Anderson's theory of rational choice,
compare the spousal guarantee cases with commercial financing contracts. In the standard commercial setting, the ordinary frame in
which a financing contract is assessed is the classical instrumental
assessment of future consequences. Pride, loyalty, and defiance of the
odds all intrude on the commercial actor's calculus of risks and rewards. But, within the frame of commercial decisionmaking, they
would be understood to be intrusive. Particularly where there are
multiple decisionmakers-partners, advisers, or directors-the deciSee RAWLS, supra note 50, at 344-48.
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sion to enter into a financing contract will be made in a framework in
which the common ground is risk allocation. That is what the decision to contract will mean for the decisionmakers. And in such a case
the reason the contract is enforced is because that is what the decisionmakers chose: to assume a future risk.
This line of analysis echoes Thomas Scanlon's emphasis on the
importance of the meaning of a promise to the actors involved.
Scanlon argues that promises may be enforceable, even in the absence of a convention of enforcement, because the self-conscious
understanding of the promisor gives rise to moral obligation. For
Scanlon, this is the case where a promisor knows that the promisee is
seeking assurance and gives the promise for that reason. In Scanlon's
formulation,
If (1) A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A will do x
(unless B consents to A's not doing x); (2) A knows that B wants to be
assured of this; (3) A acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and
has good reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) B knows that
A has the beliefs and intentions just described; (5) A intends for B to
know this, and knows that B does know it; and (6) B knows that A has
this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of some s ecialjustification, A must do x unless B consents to xs not being done.

Seen through the lens of Anderson's theory, Scanlon's rather extensive list of conditions describes a particular frame in which a promise
is made. Indeed, it includes not only the frame for the promisor but
also for the promisee.
Scanlon describes the shared frame for the vast majority of
commercial financing decisions. But this frame does not describe
most spousal guarantee decisions. And so, although "because this is
what you chose" may be sufficient reason to enforce a commercial
financing contract, more is needed to justify the enforcement of the
spousal guarantee, such as the protection of reliance interests or the
protection of a valuable convention.
C. Implicationsfor Contracts: SeparationAgreements
If we now turn to the dilemma posed in the conventional logic by
separation agreements, we will see a further point: Once a contract
logic admits that enforcement of promises-other than those selfconsciously made in a frame structured by risk allocation-requires
reasons beyond "she chose," then it also admits of greater distinction
"Thomas Scanlon, Promisesand Practices,19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 208 (1990).
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among categories of contracts. Just as the apportionment of reliance
costs might vary from setting to setting, so too might the value of the
convention of contracting and the risk that nonenforcement poses to
the convention.
Recall that, under conventional logic, the problem with separation agreements is ambivalence about according to a contract signed
at the time of separation the power to determine the financial relationship of former spouses at some point in the future. This is a
power that is not available, by contrast, to court orders determining
support; the issue in the Canadian cases has been whether the separation agreements can oust the statutory jurisdiction of the courts to
modify support payment where there has been a material change in
circumstances. The claim that they can oust state jurisdiction rests on
the assertion that respect for the autonomy of separating wives who
voluntarily sign such agreements requires the courts to enforce the
agreement except in extreme circumstances causally attributed to
economic dependency in the marriage: this is what she chose.
The economic conception of choice causes us to see the decision
to sign a separation agreement as the product of a weighing of the
costs and benefits of the available alternatives, hence justifying the
idea that enforcement is merely deference to the parties' original
wishes. Anderson's conception, however, allows us to see in the decision to sign an agreement potentially many things beyond this consequential assessment: the playing out of marital roles, lingering
identity with an ex-spouse, an expression of maternal responsibility
for the reduction of conflict or legal expenses, an assertion of control
and self-respect, guilt, or punishment of self or others. Later,
through growth and reflection, the values expressed in the decision
to sign the agreement may no longer appear rational to the signer.
What, then, is the legal significance of the earlier choice? What reasons are there for according to the earlier choice the power to now
determine the relationship between former spouses? Again, I will
suggest some possibilities without intending to resolve the issue on
the merits.
Consider first the reliance interest. As with the spousal guarantee
cases, it would seem a natural starting point to say that, whatever
meaning the decision to sign a separation agreement may have had
for the wife at the time of signing, if the husband has relied on that
signature she and not he should bear the cost of that reliance. But at
least two distinctions from the spousal guarantee cases arise.
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First, it is not clear that former husbands typically have a reliance
interest in the original separation agreement. They have an expectation interest-an expectation that they will be called on to pay so
much for so long-but it is difficult to see reliance. Specifically, how
is there a change of position that takes place as a consequence of the
separation agreement? Certainly, the husband's earning, spending,
and investment decisions will be made with reference to a given support scheme. Provided, however, that support modifications are prospective, not retroactive, and are based on the financial position of
the former spouses at the time modification is made, none of these
decisions are made in reliance on the support scheme of the separation agreement. Nor will the decisions create losses for the husband
as a consequence of the modification. The modification, of course,
will create losses; but those losses are not attributable to reliance on
the separation agreement.
If, by hypothesis, the modification replaces the separation agreement with the support scheme that would have been available as a
modification of court-ordered support, his position is not worsened
by virtue of his having entered the agreement. This is true, a fortiori,
if the separation agreement itself put in place the equivalent of what a
court would have ordered as fair support at the time of separation.
And to the extent the husband's position worsened-if, for example,
he made lump-sum payments up front that exceeded the present
value of fair support over the period between the agreement and the
modification-then modification can take that into account to avoid
imposing any reliance losses on him.
Even if reliance losses could be identified in the case of the separation agreement, however, there is a second reason why protecting
the reliance interest may not provide as forceful a reason for enforcing the separation agreement as the spousal guarantee. Former
spouses have a financial responsibility to each other; this is the essence of the spousal support aspect of family law. The starting point
for the allocation of reliance costs, then, is different in the case of
separation agreements; it is a starting point of disentangling economic interdependence and the extensive reliance that develops in
the course of marriage.
Consider now the other possible reason for enforcing spousal
guarantees: the protection of a valuable contract convention. I will
begin by focusing narrowly on the convention of separation agreements and then look more broadly at the convention of contracting
generally.
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We must be able to identify the value of separation agreements to
society generally to invoke instrumental justification for enforcement.
The value of finality and an end to litigation and conflict is an obvious
a The background regime of family law, however, is
starting point.6
already structured to achieve these goals; modifications of courtordered support payments will be made only if a change in circumstances causes an inadequacy in the original order that outweighs the
interest in finality. Thus, one source of finality arising from the separation agreement-the substantial reduction in the probability of
modification under contract relative to the probability under the
background regime-goes beyond what family law deems to be the
proper balance between fair support obligations and finality. This
cannot therefore be a direct source of social value itself. But it could
be a value for the contracting parties, particularly the payor, that
changes the content and probability of separation agreements. This
then raises the question of whether such changes are desirable for
society.
A significant reason why these changes are socially desirable is
that separation agreements economize on the costs of dispute resolution, avoiding public and private litigation expenses. The inability to
waive the right to seek modifications from the court is a loss if separation agreements are reached less often. The effect here-and it may
not be significant since court-ordered support, which is at least as
likely to be modified as the separation agreement, is the only alternative--must then be weighed against the same considerations that
justify the cost of modifying family-law proceedings to obtain greater
fairness in support agreements.
But what about the idiosyncratic value of finality to the parties
themselves? Is a convention of contracting out of modification rights
valuable because it allows parties to achieve a private balance of finality and future fairness? This perspective recalls risk allocation
65 See

Stephen M. Grant, The End of Finality, 27 R.F.L.4th (Can.) 252, 252 (1997)
(noting that court interference with agreements "misguidedly subordinates the understandable desire of divorcing spouses to achieve, if possible, finality by consensual

agreement").

As a point of reference, it is generally not possible to waive the right to modify

child support or child custody arrangements, and yet agreements on these matters are
routinely reached. Indeed, some courts have concluded that agreements on custody
can be modified without a showing of change of circumstances-the standard for

modification of court-ordered custody-because the agreement does not reflect judicial inquiry into the facts relevant to custody. SeeJoan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94YALE L.J. 757, 760 (1985).
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through contracting. Trades in risk can be valuable; the markets for
insurance, warranties, and financial guarantees are valuable institutions for this reason. Divorcing spouses may seek to trade risk by
compensating the wife, for example, for assuming the risk of future
changes in circumstances. But as with the distinction between commercial-financing agreements and spousal guarantees, the difficulty
with separation agreements is that we cannot feel confident that the
risk-allocation frame is the frame in which the contract was made.
In Santosuosso, at the end of a long-term, traditional marriage, the
wife agreed to a separation agreement providing her with $1400 per
month for twenty-four months, stipulating that "[t]hereafter, regardless of her situation, the wife [would] forever be responsible for her
own support, regardless of any change in circumstances, no matter
how catastrophic such change in circumstances might be and release[d] any and all claims which she might have for any further support in the future." 67 Two years after leaving the marriage, Mrs.
Santosuosso was still not economically self-sufficient, likely because
she only possessed a ninth-grade education, a secretarial certificate,
and the hope of completing a college diploma to enable her to obtain
good employment.
The Santosuossos' separation agreement purports to establish,
according to conventional logic, that the agreement is a deliberate
trade in risk.
But if we understand the possible stories in
Santosuosso--astory of a woman hoping to prove her worth in the face
of her husband's remarriage to a woman with postgraduate degrees,
or a story of a woman with a sense of hopelessness and self-reproach
at the end of her marriage, engaged in conflict with her children-it
is not difficult to imagine that the frame of that decision for her was
not a matter of trading risk. The meaning of the agreement as an
end in itself, and what it said about her, may have dominated her
decision to sign. Even words as strong as those found in the
Santosuossos' agreement cannot dispel the likelihood that a wife has
agreed to them, not to allocate risk, but to make a statement about
how she values herself, her family, and her situation. The policy value
of facilitating idiosyncratic allocations of risk is a complex matter of
distinguishing those cases in which the value is indeed at stake and
those in which it is a false interpretation of the values of the parties.
There are some clues and further policy considerations that could
offer guidance to courts. Courts could examine the content of the
67Santosuosso v. Santosuosso, 32 O.R.3d 143, 145 (Gen. Div. 1997).
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trade in risk to determine whether there was in fact a benefit conferred on the wife who agreed to forgo her rights to modification.
With the limited information set out in the opinion, it is perhaps
difficult to find this in Mrs. Santosuosso's case. From the court's perspective, Mrs. Santosuosso gave up substantial, long-term rights to
economic support. (Recall that in the Moge case, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that in a traditional marriage, support obligations
could extend more than sixteen years after the end of the marriage.)
If a court is to enforce a separation agreement in order to achieve the
policy goal of facilitating transactions in risk, it would seem that more
evidence of a real trade in risk is necessary before we can be confident
that risk allocation was the frame of the decision to contract.
There is, however, another consideration. In Mrs. Santosuosso's
case, the spousal support agreement was part of "what was happening
with the house proceeds, what was happening with the debts, what
was happening with the children, what was happening with the child
support. " 63 Although we would want to look at the package in order
to determine whether it was plausible to assert that Mrs. Santosuosso
entered into the agreement in a risk-allocation frame, the nature of
the package itself raises questions. First, it increases the likelihood
that the decision to waive modification rights was made in a frame
that focused on issues other than achieving value through redistributing risk, such as responsibility or guilt towards her children. Second,
it is not clear that transactions that involve trading the risk of future
financial distress for increased access to children or child support or
the ability to stay in one's home or to face an uncertain future with
reduced debt are trades that, from a social point of view, we want to
facilitate. Remember that the policy justification we are examining
looks to the social value of protecting the convention of contracting
out of modification rights. In light of the fact that women and chil70
dren suffer greater economic losses from divorce than men, it is not
clear that the law should enforce separation agreements in order to
facilitate trades that result in even less protection than family law's
background regime offers. The social value of facilitating such trades
must be assessed against this background. However one comes out

's Id. at 155 (quoting counsel for Mr. Santosuosso).
69We do not have the details of the package and so I am speculating about what
the tradeoffs might have been in the package.
70 See LENOREJ. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORcE REvOLUTION 337-43 (1985); Robert S.
Weiss, The Impact ofMaitalDissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-ParentHouseholds, 46J. MARRIAGE& FAM. 115 (1984).
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on the policy question, the point remains that the enforceability of
separation agreements is a matter of assessing, in a category-specific
way, the instrumental value of a convention of contracting out of
modification rights in a separation agreement.
Suppose we concluded that this convention, which I suggested
was a narrowly defined convention, was not instrumentally valuable.
The possibility remains that the institution of contracting as a whole,
which clearly does have value in a multitude of settings, will be at risk
if separation agreements are unenforced. This raises the issue of the
separability of categories of contract. The convention of contracting
in the marital dissolution setting is sufficiently distinct from other
settings, such as commercial contracts, that the likelihood of disrupting these other contracts is extremely small. I raise this consideration
because it is both important to include it in the assessment of the
value of a particular convention of contracting and to recognize the
different social meanings that "contract" has in settings that we reliably can demarcate.
Thus, the policy justification can be seen to vary across categories
of contracts. Once we move beyond the mere fact of choice as the
determinant of enforceability-as Anderson's conception of rational
choice-we open up distinctions among contracts. The reasons to
enforce spousal guarantees may not extend to the case of separation
agreements.
D. Implicationsfor Contracts: Surrogacy Concluded
With the analysis of the comparatively easy cases of spousal guarantees and separation agreements in hand, we now can return to surrogacy contracts. While the ultimate issues in surrogacy remain
deeply troubling, the analysis thus far sets out a way of sorting
through them.
First, we can confidently reject the notion that surrogacy agreements are framed by the parties as a deliberate transaction in risk.
Birth and intending parents do not reach an agreement to arrange
for the conception and gestation of a child and the surrender of parental status in order to reap the value of transferring risks. Birth
mothers do not enter into the arrangement in order to gain compensation in exchange for their willingness to assume the risk that surrender of their parental interests will cause them great pain.
Intending parents do not pay in order to get birth mothers to take on
this risk. Birth mothers do not promise, like insurers, to relieve in-
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tending parents of the risk that they will remain childless. Intending
parents do not pay the equivalent of an insurance premium to gain
peace of mind and a reduction in uncertainty. Risks such as these
arise and are indeed allocated as a consequence of the legal treatment of the agreement, but they are not the object of the contract for
the parties. Thus, there is no force to the claim that the surrogacy
contract is enforceable merely because the birth mother chooses, like
an insurer or guarantor, to assume the risk of the harm she now seeks
to avoid.
Does another potential reason to enforce the agreement arise
from the fact that the birth mother originally promised to relinquish
her parental status? Posner argues that it does by claiming that failure to enforce the birth mother's promise licenses her to extort a
7
higher payment from the intending parents. ' This is an application
of the concept of opportunism: reneging on a contract in order to
take advantage of the changed position-the reliance investmentsof a contracting partner and demand better contractual terms. From
an instrumental point of view, opportunism is costly because parties
may expend resources protecting themselves from opportunism, reduce their valuable reliance investments in order to minimize their
exposure, or fail to reach agreements in the first place. From an ethical perspective, opportunism is unfair advantage-taking. On the faith
of a promise and to the benefit of the promisor, the promisee has
made herself vulnerable to the promisor; it is wrong for the promisor
to then take advantage of that vulnerability and renege on the promise. Here we can see that the fact of the promise could itself give rise
to an obligation not to renege opportunistically, grounded either in
the instrumental value of a rule against opportunism or the ethics of
the situation.
In the surrogacy setting, the question whether the birth mother's
refusal to relinquish custody of the child born of the arrangement is
opportunistic raises two concerns. The first is straightforward. It
seems implausible that opportunism motivates those (apparently few)
birth mothers who choose not to relinquish custody. Moreover, this
concern easily could be addressed without routine contract enforcement; courts instead could refuse to enforce, or require restitution of,
increased payments made on the basis of an explicit or implied threat
to retain custody. Brokers could establish escrow accounts to preserve
the birth mother's ability to make restitution of any wrongfully ex71 See POSNER,

supranote 59, at 422.
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torted gains. Assuming a surrogacy market exists, it is simply not difficult to imagine market solutions to this problem.
The less straightforward concern with the opportunism justification for enforcement is the premise that the intending parents have
become locked-in to the surrogacy agreement and so become vulnerable to an opportunistic extraction of what economists have called
quasi-rents-the surplus associated with continuing with a given relationship over the alternative of discontinuing the relationship and
moving to the next best option. This surplus is positive when the
contracting parties have sunk costs in the relationship that must be
abandoned if the relationship is severed. This puts the parties at a
negotiating disadvantage once a relationship has begun that they
were not under before an agreement was struck 2 The reason the
analysis of opportunism is difficult in the surrogacy case, if it is even a
factor, is that it is not clear that the intending parents have made
investments that can be exploited in this way-that they have a reliance interest at stake. Analyzing opportunism as a reason to enforce
a surrogacy contract merely because the choice was made to enter
into the contract, therefore, requires that we analyze what we have
already identified as a key reason for enforcing contracts, namely, the
existence of a reliance interest in the contract.
What is the nature of reliance in the surrogacy setting? How is
the position of the intending parents altered as a consequence of the
agreement? Clearly, any expenditures they have made on behalf of
the birth mother constitute reliance, and will probably be recoverable
as restitution in the event the birth mother retains custody. But to
focus on this trivializes a difficult and contested aspect of surrogacy.
In cases in which the intending father is the genetic father, is his
transfer of genetic material to the birth mother reliance? What about
the forgoing of other opportunities to enter into surrogacy agreements or adoptions? More difficult still, what about the intending
parents' emotional investment in the expectation that a child will
soon arrive in their home? Even if the latter is properly characterized
as an expectation interest-which, unlike reliance, does not generate
an ethical obligation in the absence of a convention that makes protection of expectations the obligation of the promisor -there does
See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration,AppropriableRents, and the Competitive
ContractingProcess,21J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
73 Generating expectations in others, unlike generating
reliance in others, does
not carry obligation on its own; the obligation comes from the convention of contract.
What we are exploring, of course, is what that convention should look like. We can
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seem to be merit in the idea that as the date of delivery approaches,
the intending parents become increasingly emotionally attached and
hence vulnerable to demands for payments beyond what they would
have agreed to at the outset. This is the essence of opportunism.
There are no easy answers to these questions; they go to the heart
of our debates about the meaning of surrogacy arrangements and
their value. Is genetic material properly considered property in
74
which the intending father has a legally cognizable interest? Does
this way of characterizing the father's interest in his contribution to
the conception of the child ignore the true nature of his reliance,
which is his decision to father a child only if he is assured he will raise
that child? If the intending parents have forgone other opportunities
for surrogacy or adoption, are these opportunities merely delayed by
nine months? Or might they be permanently forgone because the
intending parents cannot bear to go through the process yet again?
Who bears the burden of protecting themselves against emotional
pain by resisting the pull to become emotionally invested in the child
during the pregnancy: the intending parents or the birth mother?
These issues raise serious questions about the reliance interest as
ajustification for enforcement of surrogacy agreements. Realistically,
none of these deeper reliance interests can be adequately compensated with money, even assuming that birth mothers have the resources to provide compensation or that insurers could step into the
breach. More fundamentally, the nature of reliance in this setting
raises such deeply troubling issues, issues that go to the core of our
contested social attitudes towards surrogacy, that it is far from
straightforward for contract law to enforce these agreements on the
basis of reliance. It is one thing to enforce a contract on the basis of
what is universally agreed to be reliance, but it is something else entirely for contract law to protect a reliance interest whose existence is
deeply contested.
It is almost impossible to analyze surrogacy as a matter of contract
law without addressing the fundamental questions surrogacy raises as
a matter of ethics and policy. In the absence of a contract, the birth
and genetic parents of a child have -legal relationships established by
family law, parentage statutes, and adoption statutes. As in the case of
easily conceive of a convention in which contract protects only the reliance interest
and expectations remain, as in the noncontractual case, the responsibility of the one
who expects.
7' SeeJennifer Nedelsky, Property in PotentialLife?: A RelationalApproach to Choosing
Legal Categories,6 CAN.J.L. &JURIS. 343 (1993).
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separation agreements, these background relationships provide a
starting point for the assessment of the obligations arising from the
reliance of a contract. The parents of a child have background obligations to each other and to the child, and the just allocation of reliance obligations between them must take into account those
background obligations. Every case in which parental rights are contested, whether there is a marital relationship or not, involves the loss
of reliance, the disruption of expectations, and the emotional pain of
changed or severed relationships. Family law, in the absence of contract, allocates those losses-and the fairness of their allocation in the
presence of a contract has to be assessed against that context. If it is
just to impose reliance losses, or to disrupt deeply held expectations
of relationship in order to protect a child's best interest in the absence of a contract, it also may be just to do so in the presence of a
contract.
The alternative that contract seems to offer for an easier resolution of this difficult issue on the basis of "choice" is a dangerous mirage. The decision to enter into a surrogacy contract is an act that
has complex meaning for the parties involved. Decisionmaking is not
always, or even routinely, instrumental. Thus, contract enforcement
is not justified merely because "she chose." Following the path of
justification for enforcement brings us to the essence of the complex
and contested ethics of surrogacy. The lesson is that, even as a matter
of contract law, the legal significance of surrogacy contracts is a matter of ethical and social policy. Contract here accomplishes little in
taking the relationships among the parties involved beyond the background of family law.
Having entered the contract, the birth mother is not bound, by
virtue of that act alone, to perform. If she is required by contract law
to perform, a contract law built on Anderson's understanding of rational choice as expressive choice, it will be because courts or legislatures determine that she, rather than the intending parents, should
bear the pain of the loss of the child, or that the best interests of the
child require this, or that this mechanism of producing children for
childless couples is of social value and so must be protected. These
same considerations may well lead us to the conclusion that she is not
contractually bound; not because contract must be limited in this
sphere or because the birth mother is not competent to contract in
this sphere, but because contractual logic itself leads us to that conclusion.
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E. Transcendingthe FeministDilemma of Choice
And so the dilemma of choice is transcended. The autonomy of
the chooser is not pitted against her well-being. Refusal to enforce a
surrogacy agreement, a separation agreement, or a spousal guarantee
is not a denial of respect for the autonomy of a woman who chose to
enter into the agreement. It is an acknowledgment of what autonomous, rational choice means. It is acceptance that the consequences
of choosing to enter into a contract do not follow from the fact of the
choice alone, but rather from the consequences the law attaches.
The question of what consequences attach requires an inquiry into
factors outside the fact of choice: the reliance interest of the other
parties to the contract or the policy interests of society at large in protecting a legal convention.
Anderson's theory of expressive choice allows us to transcend the
feminist dilemma of choice in contract because it emphasizes the
incommensurability of value and choice, and insists that we pay attention to the fact that choices are evaluated in different ways, according
to different frames. Moreover, it rejects the conflation of all choices
into the instrumental, consequential, risk-allocation frame that the
economist's model employs. The feminist dilemmas that come to the
fore are troubling precisely because these are settings in which the
In
instrumental risk-allocation frame is patently inappropriate.
Anderson's view, it would be irrational to evaluate the state of affairs
in purely instrumental or consequential terms. These are settings in
which it would represent a failure to adequately express values-of
love, self-worth, respect, duty, and so on-to choose as the economist
understands us to choose.
A contract logic based on Anderson's theory of expressive choice
might require enforcement of contracts for mortgage guarantees or
support payments or parental status. But enforcement will not be due
to indifference to the reality of evolving rational choice, or because a
woman's choice has nullified the background claims that she has to
relief from loss of her home, to support payments, or to a relationship
with a child to whom she has given birth. Rather, enforcement will be
required because the full picture of those background claims, including the reliance interests generated by her choice and the policy interests others have in the protection of a convention of contractual
choice, justifies enforcement. If enforcement is not justified, it will
not be a failure of respect for the autonomy of the woman who made
the promise. It will not be because she is not capable of rational
choice or in need of exceptional protection from the courts. It will,
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indeed, be because she chooses rationally, both at the time of her
contract and at the time she changes her mind, and because contract
law understands what this means.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE FEMINIST PUZZLES

Anderson's reconceptualization of rational choice gives us a basis
for rejecting the conventional logic of contract law that enforces a
contractual choice simply because it is a choice. When the choice is
expressive and not instrumental, as it often is, we cannot evade the
need to provide justification for the decision to attach legal consequences to the choice.
In working through the feminist puzzles discussed above, I have
argued that the structure of a contract law based on an appreciation
of expressive choice would begin with an assessment of whether a
given category of contract normally is entered into in a risk-allocation
frame. Absent the risk-allocation frame, there is a need to assess the
reasons there might be for enforcement. I have suggested two relevant inquiries for the identification of potential reasons for enforcement: (1) whether there are reliance interests at stake and what the
appropriate allocation is of those reliance interests against the background relationship between the contracting parties; and (2) whether
there are instrumental justifications for enforcement flowing from the
value of contracting in a given case and the risk that nonenforcement
within that category poses to the stability of contracts in other categories. Note that, other than the initial inquiry into whether a riskallocation frame can be fairly presumed, Anderson's contract logic
does not proceed by judging the quality of the choice or the adequacy
of the frame in which it was made. To do so would follow the conventional logic, which holds that all that matters is whether a choice was
adequately rational. Perhaps paradoxically, once we have recognized
that choices are routinely expressive and complex in their meaning,
we break free from the need to assess the quality of choice. The
normative power of the choice comes not from how good it is, but
from factors outside of it: reliance, institutional value, and so on. We
will still care about the voluntariness of the choice and the information available to the person who made it. What makes this contract
and not tort is still that it is the voluntary and informed choice of the
promisor to enter into a contract that triggers potential liability. Having established those factors, however, we shift attention outside of
the promisor to the reasons found in relations with other parties for
enforcing the promise.
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I have explored the implications of Anderson's expressive theory
of choice in terms of feminist puzzles because those dilemmas of
choice expose the inadequacy of a contract law founded only on the
conventional view of rational choice. The analysis, however, extends
across the domain of contract law.
First, this analysis preserves the core of traditional commercial
contract, including contracts for insurance, warranties, futures contracts, financing agreements, profit-sharing agreements, and the traditional remedy of expectation damages. We can feel confident that
these traditional commercial contracts are evaluated within a riskallocation frame. Moreover, transactions in risk are of commercial
value, permitting parties to shift risk to those able to bear it at lower
cost or better able to create incentives for effort and care. Enforcing
contracts made within a risk-allocation frame is instrumentally valuable because such transactions would be largely impossible without
enforcement.
Second, my analysis preserves a core reason for enforcing commercial contracts up to expectation-protection against opportunism.
Although I have rejected fear of opportunism in the surrogacy setting, strategic and opportunistic behavior clearly is a factor in commercial relationships. For example, price or quality agreements are
less valuable if they require renegotiation to avoid exposing either
party to a credible threat.
Not all contracts, however, are breached for opportunistic reasons-nor are all ex post renegotiations of price or other terms opportunistic. Contract breach and modification are often about
adjusting to evolving conditions and information. This need for adjustment, and the fact that not all contracts are formed in a riskallocation frame, underlies the distinction between discrete and relational contracts. Discrete contracts are really the paradigm of conventional contract law. From the analysis developed here, it is clear
that discrete contracts represent the subset of contracts formed in a
risk-allocation frame and/or contracts in which the parties should be
held to their agreements in order to prevent opportunistic defection.
Discrete contracts are typically sales or commodities contracts, transferring property interests and commercial risks. Relational contracts,
in contrast, structure cooperative activity that extends over time.
They encourage reliance by coordinating efforts, communicating
goals, and securing commitments. They provide mechanisms for
resolving disputes and adapting to uncertainties. They establish governance schemes and spheres of discretion. They are woven from
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and into a fabric of societal and relationship-specific norms. They
may make only a limited contribution to the parties' understanding
of their obligations to one another.
Analyzed from the perspective of a contract law based on the expressive theory of choice, relational contracts comprise a large category of non-risk-allocation contracts. 7s Indeed, the expressive theory
of choice explains the values and norms emphasized by relational
contract scholars-values such as solidarity, trust, reciprocity, and
cooperativeness. My analysis suggests that the approach to enforcement of such a contract must go beyond the fact of consent to the
contract. We need to consider the reliance interests at stake, and
allocate responsibility for those interests based on the relationship
between the parties. This will lead to a reliance remedy for breach of
relational contracts: a remedy that secures cooperation but distributes the losses associated with a relationship that has become less
tenable or less valuable than either of the parties had expected. The
need to look beyond the fact of choice in enforcing relational contracts supports giving attention to the norms emphasized by many
relational contract scholars. Going beyond the fact of choice also
avoids the "death of contract" result: Because choice alone is not a
sufficient ground for contractual enforcement, enforcement
grounded in external aspects of the choice, such as the relationship
of the parties and the just distribution of reliance costs between them,
is integral to the idea of contractual obligation.
Enforcement of relational contracts on the basis of an expressive
theory of choice implicates instrumental concerns. Potential opportunistic breach would justify enforcement up to expectation. Minimizing the transaction costs of alternative governance structures
would require making salient distinctions among contract categories.
For example, franchising contracts, employment contracts, and government contracts might warrant differential treatment, while finer
distinctions among commercial contracts might not. Indeed, much
of the economic analysis of relational contract law is of this instrumental variety. The expressive theory brings agent-centered contract
logic that supports this approach.
The expressive theory of choice also directs attention to the distinctions among contract categories. Conventional contract law, like
conventional rational choice theory, treats all decisions to contract as

7' Relational contracts can contain risk-allocation terms. My focus here, however,
is on what distinguishes relational from discrete contracting.
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essentially the same. Consequently, it advances uniform reasons for
enforceability across all categories: commercial, family, employment,
government; relational and discrete. This conflation of contract categories explains much of the tension in modem contract law. Without
the expressive theory of choice, accounting for the reality that presses
through the gaps in contract law poses the same dilemma as the
feminist puzzles do; under conventional logic, looking beyond the
existence of voluntary choice amounts to paternalism and interference with choice. Conventional logic is based on a flawed conception
of choice. Adopting Anderson's theory of choice, we can transcend
the dilemma in either feminist settings or commercial contract settings. Respect for the multiplicity of frames in which a decision to
contract can be made often entails looking beyond the fact of choice
to the complexity of what it means to choose.
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